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ABSTRACT
The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system
for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-
belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating
the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about
belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties
task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another
person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose
that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties
task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. We
also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a somewhat more
complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of
inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless
there is belief to the contrary.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the area of cognitive psychology there is a reasoning
task called the Smarties task. The following is one version
of the Smarties task.
A child is shown a Smarties tube where unbe-
knownst to the child the Smarties have been re-
placed by pencils. The child is asked: “What do
you think is inside the tube?” The child answers
“Smarties!” The tube is then shown to contain
pencils only. The child is then asked: “If your
mother comes into the room and we show this
tube to her, what will she think is inside?”
It is well-known from experiments that most childred above
the age of four correctly say “Smarties” (thereby attributing
a false belief to the mother) whereas younger children say
“Pencils” (what they know is inside the tube). For autistic1
children the cutoff age is higher than four years, which is
one reason to the interest in the Smarties task.
The Smarties task is one out of a family of reasoning tasks
called false-belief tasks showing the same pattern, that most
children above four answer correctly, but autistic children
have to be older. This was first observed in the paper [4]
1Autism is a psychiatric disorder with the following three
diagnostic criteria: 1. Impairment in social interaction. 2.
Impairment in communication. 3. Restricted repetitive and
stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities.
For details, see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV), published by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association.
TARK 2013, Chennai, India.
Copyright 2013 by the authors.
in connection with another false-belief task called the Sally-
Anne task. Starting with the authors of that paper, many
researchers in cognitive psychology have argued that there is
a link between autism and a lack of what is called theory of
mind, which is a capacity to imagine other people’s mental
states, for example their beliefs. For a very general formula-
tion of the theory of mind deficit hypothesis of autism, see
the book [3].
Giving a correct answer to the Smarties task involves a
shift of perspective to another person, namely the mother.
You have to put yourself in another person’s shoes, so to
speak. Since the capacity to take another perspective is a
precondition for figuring out the correct answer to the Smar-
ties task and other false-belief tasks, the fact that autistic
children have a higher cutoff age is taken to support the
claim that autists have a limited or delayed theory of mind.
For a critical overview of these arguments, see the book [23]
by Keith Stenning and Michiel van Lambalgen. The books
[23] and [3] not only consider theory of mind at a cognitive
level, such as in connection with false-belief tasks, but they
also discuss it from a biological point of view.
In a range of works van Lambalgen and co-authors have
given a detailed logical analysis (but not a full formalization)
of the reasoning taking place in the Smarties task and other
false-belief tasks in terms of closed-world reasoning as used
in non-monotonic logics, see in particular [23]. The analy-
sis of the Smarties task of [23] (in Subsection 9.4.4) makes
use of a modality B for belief satisfying two standard modal
principles.2 The first principle is B(φ → ψ) → (Bφ → Bψ)
(principle (9.5) at page 251 in [23]). The second principle is
the rule called necessitation, that is, from φ derive Bφ (this
principle is not mentioned explicitly in [23], but is implicit
in the analysis given at the bottom of page 256). These
two principles together imply that belief is closed under log-
ical consequence, that is, Bψ can be derived from φ → ψ
together with Bφ, which at least for human agents is im-
plausible (when the modal operator stands for knowledge,
this is called logical omniscience).
In the present paper we give a logical analysis of the per-
spective shift required to give a correct answer to the Smar-
ties and Sally-Anne tasks, and we demonstrate that these
tasks can be fully formalized in a hybrid-logical proof sys-
tem not assuming principles implying logical omniscience,
namely the natural deduction system described in Chapter
2Strictly speaking, the modality B in [23] is not formalized
in terms of modal logic, but in terms of what is called event
calculus, where B is a predicate that can take formulas as
arguments.
186
4 of the book [8], and the paper [7] as well. Beside not suf-
fering from logical omniscience, why is a natural deduction
system for hybrid modal logic appropriate to this end?
• The subject of proof-theory is the notion of proof and
formal, that is, symbolic, systems for representing proofs.
Formal proofs built according to the rules of proof
systems can be used to represent—describe the struc-
ture of—mathematical arguments as well as arguments
in everyday human practice. Beside giving a way to
distinguish logically correct arguments from incorrect
ones, proof systems also give a number of ways to char-
acterize the structure of arguments. Natural deduction
style proofs are meant to formalize the way human be-
ings actually reason, so natural deduction is an obvious
candidate when looking for a proof system to formalize
the Smarties task in.
• In the standard Kripke semantics for modal logic, the
truth-value of a formula is relative to points in a set,
that is, a formula is evaluated “locally” at a point,
where points usually are taken to represent possible
worlds, times, locations, epistemic states, persons, states
in a computer, or something else. Hybrid logics are
extended modal logics where it is possible to directly
refer to such points in the logical object language,
whereby locality can be handled explicitly, for exam-
ple, when reasoning about time one can formulate a
series of statements about what happens at specific
times, which is not possible in ordinary modal logic.
Thus, when points in the Kripke semantics represent
local perspectives, hybrid-logical machinery can han-
dle explicitly the different perspectives in the Smarties
task.
For the above reasons, we have been able to turn our in-
formal logical analysis of the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks
into formal hybrid-logical natural deduction proofs closely
reflecting the shift between different perspectives.
The natural deduction system we use for our formaliza-
tions is a modified version of a natural deduction system
for a logic of situations similar to hybrid logic, originally
introduced in the paper [19] by Jerry Seligman. The mod-
ified system was introduced in the paper [7], and later on
considered in Chapter 4 of the book [8], both by the present
author. In what follows we shall simply refer to the modified
system as Seligman’s system.
Now, Seligman’s system allows any formula to occur in it,
which is different from the most common proof systems for
hybrid logic that only allow formulas of a certain form called
satisfaction statements. This is related to a different way of
reasoning in Seligman’s system, which captures particularly
well the reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks. We
prove a completeness result which also says that Seligman’s
system is analytic, that is, we prove that any valid formula
has a derivation satisfying the subformula property. Analyt-
icity guarentees that any valid argument can be formalized
using only subformulas of the premises and the conclusion.
The notion of analyticity goes back to G.W. Leibniz (1646–
1716) who called a proof analytic if and only if the proof
is based on concepts contained in the proven statement, the
main aim being to be able to construct a proof by an analysis
of the result, cf. [2].
The present paper is structured as follows. In the second
section we recapitulate the basics of hybrid logic, readers
well-versed in hybrid logic can safely skip this section. In
the third section we introduce Seligman’s natural deduction
system for hybrid logic. In the fourth and fifth sections we
formalize two versions of the Smarties task using this system,
and in the sixth section we formalize the Sally-Anne task.
A discussion can be found in the seventh section, in the
eightth section there are some brief remarks on other work,
and in the final section some remarks on further work. In
the appendix we prove the above mentioned completeness
result, which also demonstrates analyticity.
2. HYBRID LOGIC
The term“hybrid logic”covers a number of logics obtained
by adding further expressive power to ordinary modal logic.
The history of what now is known as hybrid logic goes back
to the philosopher Arthur Prior’s work in the 1960s. See the
handbook chapter [1] for a detailed overview of hybrid logic.
See the book [8] on hybrid logic and its proof-theory.
The most basic hybrid logic is obtained by extending or-
dinary modal logic with nominals, which are propositional
symbols of a new sort. In the Kripke semantics a nominal is
interpreted in a restricted way such that it is true at exactly
one point. If the points are given a temporal reading, this en-
ables the formalization of natural language statements that
are true at exactly one time, for example
it is five o’clock May 10th 2007
which is true at the time five o’clock May 10th 2007, but false
at all other times. Such statements cannot be formalized in
ordinary modal logic, the reason being that there is only
one sort of propositional symbol available, namely ordinary
propositional symbols, which are not restricted to being true
at exactly one point.
Most hybrid logics involve further additional machinery
than nominals. There is a number of options for adding
further machinery; here we shall consider a kind of opera-
tor called satisfaction operators. The motivation for adding
satisfaction operators is to be able to formalize a statement
being true at a particular time, possible world, or something
else. For example, we want to be able to formalize that the
statement “it is raining” is true at the time five o’clock May
10th 2007, that is, that
at five o’clock May 10th 2007 it is raining.
This is formalized by the formula @ar where the nominal a
stands for “it is five o’clock May 10th 2007” as above and
where r is an ordinary propositional symbol that stands for
“it is raining”. It is the part @a of the formula @ar that
is called a satisfaction operator. In general, if a is a nomi-
nal and φ is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula @aφ
can be built (in some literature the notation a : φ is used in-
stead of @aφ). A formula of this form is called a satisfaction
statement. The formula @aφ expresses that the formula φ is
true at one particular point, namely the point to which the
nominal a refers. Nominals and satisfaction operators are
the most common pieces of hybrid-logical machinery, and
are what we need for the purpose of the present paper.
In what follows we give the formal syntax and semantics
of hybrid logic. It is assumed that a set of ordinary proposi-
tional symbols and a countably infinite set of nominals are
given. The sets are assumed to be disjoint. The metavari-
ables p, q, r, . . . range over ordinary propositional symbols
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and a, b, c, . . . range over nominals. Formulas are defined
by the following grammar.
S ::= p | a | S ∧ S | S → S | ⊥ | S | @aS
The metavariables φ, ψ, θ, . . . range over formulas. Negation
is defined by the convention that ¬φ is an abbreviation for
φ → ⊥. Similarly, ♦φ is an abbreviation for ¬¬φ.
Definition 2.1. A model for hybrid logic is a tuple
(W,R, {Vw}w∈W )
where
1. W is a non-empty set;
2. R is a binary relation on W ; and
3. for each w, Vw is a function that to each ordinary
propositional symbol assigns an element of {0, 1}.
The pair (W,R) is called a frame. Note that a model for
hybrid logic is the same as a model for ordinary modal logic.
Given a model M = (W,R, {Vw}w∈W ), an assignment is a
function g that to each nominal assigns an element of W .
The relationM, g, w |= φ is defined by induction, where g is
an assignment, w is an element of W , and φ is a formula.
M, g, w |= p iff Vw(p) = 1
M, g, w |= a iff w = g(a)
M, g, w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, g, w |= φ and M, g, w |= ψ
M, g, w |= φ → ψ iff M, g, w |= φ implies M, g, w |= ψ
M, g, w |= ⊥ iff falsum
M, g, w |= φ iff for any v ∈ W such that wRv,
M, g, v |= φ
M, g, w |= @aφ iff M, g, g(a) |= φ
By convention M, g |= φ means M, g, w |= φ for every ele-
ment w of W and M |= φ means M, g |= φ for every assign-
ment g. A formula φ is valid if and only if M |= φ for any
model M.
3. SELIGMAN’S SYSTEM
In this section we introduce Seligman’s natural deduction
systems for hybrid logic. Before defining the system, we shall
sketch the basics of natural deduction. Natural deduction
style derivation rules for ordinary classical first-order logic
were originally introduced by Gerhard Gentzen in [11] and
later on developed much further by Dag Prawitz in [16, 17].
See [24] for a general introduction to natural deduction sys-
tems. With reference to Gentzen’s work, Prawitz made the
following remarks on the significance of natural deduction.
. . . the essential logical content of intuitive log-
ical operations that can be formulated in the
languages considered can be understood as com-
posed of the atomic inferences isolated by Gentzen.
It is in this sense that we may understand the
terminology natural deduction.
Nevertheless, Gentzen’s systems are also natu-
ral in the more superficial sense of corresponding
rather well to informal practices; in other words,
the structure of informal proofs are often pre-
served rather well when formalized within the
systems of natural deduction. ([17], p. 245)
Similar views on natural deduction are expressed many places,
for example in a textbook by Warren Goldfarb.
What we shall present is a system for deductions,
sometimes called a system of natural deduction,
because to a certain extent it mimics certain nat-
ural ways we reason informally. In particular,
at any stage in a deduction we may introduce a
new premise (that is, a new supposition); we may
then infer things from this premise and eventu-
ally eliminate the premise (discharge it). ([13],
p. 181)
Basically, what is said by the second part of the quotation
by Prawitz, and the quotation by Goldfarb as well, is that
the structure of informal human arguments can be described
by natural deduction derivations.
Of course, the observation that natural deduction deriva-
tions often can formalize, or mimic, informal reasoning does
not itself prove that natural deduction is the mechanism
underlying human deductive reasoning, that is, that formal
rules in natural deduction style are somehow built into the
human cognitive architecture. However, this view is held by
a number of psychologists, for example Lance Rips in the
book [18], where he provides experimental support for the
claim.
. . . a person faced with a task involving deduction
attempts to carry it out through a series of steps
that takes him or her from an initial description
of the problem to its solution. These intermedi-
ate steps are licensed by mental inference rules,
such as modus ponens, whose output people find
intuitively obvious. ([18], p. x)
This is the main claim of the“mental logic”school in the psy-
chology of reasoning (whose major competitor is the“mental
models” school, claiming that the mechanism underlying hu-
man reasoning is the construction of models, rather than the
application of topic-neutral formal rules).
We have now given a brief motivation for natural deduc-
tion and proceed to a formal definition. A derivation in a
natural deduction system has the form of a finite tree where
the nodes are labelled with formulas such that for any for-
mula occurrence φ in the derivation, either φ is a leaf of the
derivation or the immediate successors of φ in the derivation
are the premises of a rule-instance which has φ as the con-
clusion. In what follows, the metavariables π, τ , . . . range
over derivations. A formula occurrence that is a leaf is called
an assumption of the derivation. The root of a derivation
is called the end-formula of the derivation. All assumptions
are annotated with numbers. An assumption is either undis-
charged or discharged. If an assumption is discharged, then
it is discharged at one particular rule-instance and this is in-
dicated by annotating the assumption and the rule-instance
with identical numbers. We shall often omit this informa-
tion when no confusion can occur. A rule-instance annotated
with some number discharges all undischarged assumptions
that are above it and are annotated with the number in ques-
tion, and moreover, are occurrences of a formula determined
by the rule-instance.
Two assumptions in a derivation belong to the same parcel
if they are annotated with the same number and are occur-
rences of the same formula, and moreover, either are both
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Figure 1: Rules for connectives
φ ψ
(∧I)
φ ∧ ψ
φ ∧ ψ
(∧E1)
φ
φ ∧ ψ
(∧E2)
ψ
[φ]···
ψ
(→ I)
φ → ψ
φ → ψ φ
(→ E)
ψ
[¬φ]···⊥
(⊥)∗
φ
a φ
(@I)
@aφ
a @aφ
(@E)
φ
[♦c]···
@cφ
(I)†
φ
φ ♦e
(E)
@eφ
∗ φ is a propositional letter.
† c does not occur free in φ or in any undischarged as-
sumptions other than the specified occurrences of ♦c.
undischarged or have both been discharged at the same rule-
instance. Thus, in this terminology rules discharge parcels.
We shall make use of the standard notation
[φr]··· π
ψ
which means a derivation π where ψ is the end-formula and
[φr] is the parcel consisting of all undischarged assumptions
that have the form φr.
We shall make use of the following conventions. The
metavariables Γ, Δ, . . . range over sets of formulas. A
derivation π is called a derivation of φ if the end-formula of
π is an occurrence of φ, and moreover, π is called a deriva-
tion from Γ if each undischarged assumption in π is an oc-
currence of a formula in Γ (note that numbers annotating
undischarged assumptions are ignored). If there exists a
derivation of φ from ∅, then we shall simply say that φ is
derivable.
A typical feature of natural deduction is that there are two
different kinds of rules for each connective; there are rules
called introduction rules which introduce a connective (that
is, the connective occurs in the conclusion of the rule, but
not in the premises) and there are rules called elimination
rules which eliminate a connective (the connective occurs in
a premiss of the rule, but not in the conclusion). Introduc-
tion rules have names in the form (. . . I . . .), and similarly,
elimination rules have names in the form (. . . E . . .).
Now, Seligman’s natural deduction system is obtained
from the rules given in Figure 1 and Figure 2. We let N′H
denote the system thus obtained. The system N′H is taken
from [7] and Chapter 4 of [8] where it is shown to be sound
and complete wrt. the formal semantics given in the previ-
Figure 2: Rules for nominals
φ1 . . . φn
[φ1] . . . [φn][a]···
ψ
(Term)∗
ψ
[a]···
ψ
(Name)†
ψ
∗ φ1, . . . , φn, and ψ are all satisfaction statements and there
are no undischarged assumptions in the derivation of ψ be-
sides the specified occurrences of φ1, . . . , φn, and a.
† a does not occur in ψ or in any undischarged assumptions
other than the specified occurrences of a.
ous section. As mentioned earlier, this system is a modified
version of a system originally introduced in [19]. The system
of [19] was modified in [7] and [8] with the aim of obtaining
a desirable property called closure under substitution, see
Subsection 4.1.1 of [8] for further explanation.
4. A FIRST EXAMPLE
The way of reasoning in Seligman’s system is different
from the way of reasoning in most other proof systems for
hybrid logic3. In this section we give the first example of
reasoning using the (Term) rule (displayed in Figure 2).
Beside the (Term) rule, the key rules in the example are
the rules (@I) and (@E) (displayed in Figure 1), which are
the introduction and elimination rules for the satisfaction
operator. The rule (@I) formalizes the following informal
argument.
It is Christmas Eve 2011; it is snowing, so at
Christmas Eve 2011 it is snowing.
And the rule (@E) formalizes the following.
It is Christmas Eve 2011; at Christmas Eve 2011
it is snowing, so it is snowing.
The (Term) rule enables hypothetical reasoning where rea-
soning is about what is the case at a specific time, possibly
different from the actual time. Consider the following infor-
mal argument.
At May 10th 2007 it is raining; if it is raining it
is wet, so at May 10th 2007 it is wet.
The reasoning in this example argument is about what is
the case at May 10th 2007. If this argument is made at a
specific actual time, the time of evaluation is first shifted
from the actual time to a hypothetical time, namely May
10th 2007, then some reasoning is performed involving the
premise “if it is raining it is wet”, and finally the time of
evaluation is shifted back to the actual time. The reader
is invited to verify this shift of time by checking that the
argument is correct, and note that the reader himself (or
herself) imagines being at the time May 10th 2007. Note
that the premise “if it is raining it is wet” represents a causal
relation holding at all times.
3We here have in mind natural deduction, Gentzen, and
tableau systems for hybrid logic, not axiom systems. Proof
systems of the first three types are suitable for actual reason-
ing, carried out by a human, a computer, or in some other
medium. Axiom systems are usually not meant for actual
reasoning, but are of a more foundational interest.
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Now, in a temporal setting, the side-condition on the rule
(Term) requiring that all the formulas φ1, . . . , φn, ψ are
satisfaction statements (see Figure 2) ensures that these for-
mulas are temporally definite, that is, they have the same
truth-value at all times, so the truth-value of these formu-
las are not affected by a shift of temporal perspective. The
rule would not be sound if the formulas were not temporally
definite.
We now proceed to the formalization of the above argu-
ment about what is the case at May 10th 2007. We make
use of the following symbolizations
p It is raining
q It is wet
a May 10th 2007
and we take the formula p → q as an axiom since it repre-
sents a causal relation between p and q holding at all times
(note that we use an axiom since the relation p → q holds
between the particular propositions p and q, we do not use
an axiom schema since the relation obviously does not hold
between any pair of propositions).4 Then the argument can
be formalized as the right-hand-side derivation in Figure 3.
It is instructive to see how the right-hand-side derivation
in Figure 3 is built, so at the left-hand-side of the figure we
have displayed the derivation to which the (Term) rule is
applied, whereby the right-hand-side derivation is obtained.
Thus, the application of the (Term) rule in the right-hand-
side derivation delimits a piece of reasoning taking place
at a certain hypothetical time, which is the left-hand-side
derivation.
The above example argument is similar to an example
given in the paper [19]. The following is a slightly reformu-
lated version.
In Abu Dabi alcohol is forbidden; if alcohol is
forbidden Sake is forbidden, so in Abu Dabi Sake
is forbidden.
Thus, the example of [19] involves spatial locations rather
than times, and the shift is to a hypothetical place, namely
the city of Abu Dabi.
Formally, the shift to a hypothetical point of evaluation
effected by the rule (Term) can be seen by inspecting the
proof that the rule (Term) is sound: The world of evalu-
ation is shifted from the actual world to the hypothetical
world where the nominal a is true (see Figure 2), then some
reasoning is performed involving the delimited subderiva-
tion which by induction is assumed to be sound, and finally
the world of evaluation is shifted back to the actual world.
Soundness of the system N′H, including soundness of the
rule (Term), is proved in Theorem 4.1 in Section 4.3 of [8].
4One of the anonymous reviewers asked why the premise “if
it is raining it is wet” is formalized as p → q using classical
implication, rather than a form of non-monotonic implica-
tion. Like in many cases when classical logic is used to for-
malize natural language statements, there is an idealization
in our choice of classical implication. We think this ideal-
ization is justified since our main goal is to formalize the
perspective shift involved in the example argument, which
we presume is orthogonal to the issue of non-monotonicity.
We note in passing that our premise “if it is raining it is wet”
corresponds to the premise “if alcohol is forbidden Sake is
forbidden”in Seligman’s example argument briefly described
below, and Seligman also uses classical implication, or to be
precise, machinery equivalent to classical implication, [19].
See also Footnote 6.
The rule (Term) is very different from other rules in proof
systems for hybrid logic, roughly, this rule replaces rules for
equational reasoning in other systems, see for example the
rules in the natural deduction system given in Section 2.2 of
the book [8].
In passing we mention that the way in which the (Term)
rule delimits a subderivation is similar to the way subderiva-
tions are delimited by so-called boxes in linear logic, and
more specifically, the way a subderivation is delimited by
the introduction rule for the modal operator  in the nat-
ural deduction system for S4 given in [5], making use of
explicit substitutions in derivations.
5. THE SMARTIES TASK
(TEMPORAL SHIFT VERSION)
In this section we will give a formalization which has ex-
actly the same structure as the formalization in the previ-
ous section, but which in other respects is quite different. It
turns out that a temporal shift like the one just described in
the previous section also takes place in the following version
of the Smarties task, where instead of a shift of perspective
to another person, there is a shift of perspective to another
time.5
A child is shown a Smarties tube where unbe-
knownst to the child the Smarties have been re-
placed by pencils. The child is asked: “What do
you think is inside the tube?” The child answers
“Smarties!” The tube is then shown to contain
pencils only. The child is then asked: “Before
this tube was opened, what did you think was
inside?”
See [14] for more on the temporal version of the Smarties
task. Below we shall formalize each step in the logical rea-
soning taking place when giving a correct answer to the task,
but before that, we give an informal analysis. Let us call the
child Peter. Let a be the time where Peter answers the first
question, and let t be the time where he answers the second
one. To answer the second question, Peter imagines him-
self being at the earlier time a where he was asked the first
question. At that time he deduced that there were Smar-
ties inside the tube from the fact that it is a Smarties tube.
Imagining being at the time a, Peter reasons that since he at
that time deduced that there were Smarties inside, he must
also have come to believe that there were Smarties inside.
Therefore, at the time t he concludes that at the earlier time
a he believed that there were Smarties inside.
We now proceed to the full formalization. We first extend
the language of hybrid logic with two modal operators, D
and B. We make use of the following symbolizations
D Peter deduces that ...
B Peter believes that ...
p There are Smarties inside the tube
a The time where the first question is asked
and we take the principle Dφ → Bφ as an axiom schema (it
holds whatever proposition is substituted for the metavari-
able φ, hence an axiom schema). This is principle (9.4) in
5The author thanks Michiel van Lambalgen for mentioning
the Smarties task in an email exchange where the author
suggested that the shift of perspective in the hybrid-logical
rule (Term) could be of relevance in connection with the
theory of mind view of autism.
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Figure 3: First example formalization (before and after application of the (Term) rule)
a
a @ap
(@E)
p
(Axiom)
p → q
(→ E)
q
(@I)
@aq
@ap
[a]
[a] [@ap]
(@E)
p
(Axiom)
p → q
(→ E)
q
(@I)
@aq
(Term)
@aq
Figure 4: Formalization of the child’s reasoning in the Smarties task (both temporal and person version)
@aDp
[a]
[a] [@aDp]
(@E)
Dp
(Axiom schema)
Dp → Bp
(→ E)
Bp
(@I)
@aBp
(Term)
@aBp
[23].6 Then the shift of temporal perspective in the Smarties
task can be formalized very directly in Seligman’s system as
the derivation in Figure 4. Recall that the derivation is
meant to formalize each step in Peters’s reasoning at the
time t where the second question is answered. The premise
@aDp in the derivation says that Peter at the earlier time a
deduced that there were Smarties inside the tube, which he
remembers at t.
Note that the formalization in Figure 4 does not involve
the  operator, so this operator could have been omitted to-
gether with the associated rules (I) and (E) in Figure 1.
Since this proof system is complete, the  operator satisfies
logical omniscience. The operators D and B are only taken
to satisfy the principle Dφ → Bφ, as mentioned above.
Compare the derivation in Figure 4 to the right-hand-side
derivation in Figure 3 in the previous section and note that
the structure is exactly the same. Note that what we have
done is that we have formalized the logical reasoning tak-
ing place when giving the correct answer “Smarties”. Note
also that the actual content of the tube, namely pencils, is
not even mentioned in the formalization, so it is clear from
the formalization that the actual content of the tube is not
relevant to figure out the correct answer. Accordingly, our
formalization does not tell what goes wrong when a child
incorrectly answers “Pencils”.
6. THE SMARTIES TASK
(PERSON SHIFT VERSION)
As a stepping stone between the temporal version of the
6 Analogous to the question in Footnote 4, it can be asked
why we use classical implication in Dφ → Bφ, rather than
a form of non-monotonic implication. Again, the answer is
that this is an idealization, but we presume that the per-
spective shift involved in the Smarties task is orthogonal to
the issue of non-monotonicity, at least from a logical point
of view. In this connection we remark that principle (9.4)
in [23] also uses classical implication (the non-monotonicity
in the logical analysis of the Smarties task of [23] does not
concern principle (9.4), but other principles).
Smarties task we considered in the previous section, and the
Sally-Anne task we shall consider in the next section, we
in the present section take a look again at the version of
the Smarties task described in the introduction. The only
difference between the version in the introduction and the
version in the previous section is the second question where
“Before this tube was opened, what did you think
was inside?”
obviously gives rise to a temporal shift of perspective, whereas
“If your mother comes into the room and we show
this tube to her, what will she think is inside?”
gives rise to a shift of perspective to another person, namely
the imagined mother.
To give a correct answer to the latter of these two ques-
tions, the child Peter imagines being the mother coming
into the room. Imagining being the mother, Peter reasons
that the mother must deduce that there are Smarties inside
the tube from the fact that it is a Smarties tube, and from
that, she must also come to believe that there are Smarties
inside. Therefore, Peter concludes that the mother would
believe that there are Smarties inside.
The derivation formalizing this argument is exactly the
same as in the temporal case dealt with in previous section,
Figure 4, but the symbols are interpreted differently, namely
as
D Deduces that ...
B Believes that ...
p There are Smarties inside the tube
a The imagined mother
So now nominals refer to persons rather than times. Ac-
cordingly, the modal operator B now symbolize the belief
of the person represented by the point of evaluation, rather
than Peter’s belief at the time of evaluation, etc. Thus, the
premise @aDp in the derivation in Figure 4 says that the
imagined mother deduces that there are Smarties inside the
tube, which the child doing the reasoning takes to be the
case since the mother is imagined to be present in the room.
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Incidentally, letting points in the Kripke model represent
persons is exactly what is done in Arthur Prior’s egocentric
logic, see Section 1.3 in the book [8], in particular pp. 15–
16. In egocentric logic the accessibility relation represents
the taller-than relation, but this relation is obviously not
relevant here.
7. THE SALLY-ANNE TASK
In this section we will give a formalization of a somewhat
more complicated reasoning task called the Sally-Anne task.
The following is one version.
A child is shown a scene with two doll protago-
nists, Sally and Anne, having respectively a bas-
ket and a box. Sally first places a marble into
her basket. Then Sally leaves the scene, and in
her absence, the marble is transferred by Anne
and hidden in her box. Then Sally returns, and
the child is asked: “Where will Sally look for her
marble?”
Most children above the age of four correctly responds where
Sally must falsely believe the marble to be (in the basket)
whereas younger children respond where they know the mar-
ble to be (in the box). Again, for autists, the cutoff is higher.
Below we shall formalize the correct response to the task,
but before that, we give an informal analysis. Let us call
the child Peter again. Let t1 be the time where he answers
the question. To answer the question, Peter imagines him-
self being Sally at an earlier time t0 before she leaves the
scene, but after she places the marble in her basket. Imag-
ining being Sally, he reasons as follows: At the time t0 Sally
believes that the marble is in the box since she can see it.
At the time t1, after she has returned, she deduces that the
marble is still in the box as she has no belief to the con-
trary, and since Sally deduces that the marble is in the box,
she must also come to believe it. Therefore, Peter concludes
that Sally believes that the marble is in the box.
In our formalization we make use of a tiny fragment of
first-order hybrid logic, involving the unary predicate P (t),
the binary predicate t < u, and the modal operators S, D
and B, but no quantifiers. We make use of the following
symbolizations
p(t) The marble is in the basket at the time t
t < u The time t is before the time u
S Sees that ...
D Deduces that ...
B Believes that ...
a The person Sally
We also make use of the following three principles
Sφ → Bφ
Dφ → Bφ
Bφ(t) ∧ t < u ∧ ¬B¬φ(u) → Dφ(u)
The first two are versions of principles (9.2) and (9.4) in the
book [23] and the third is similar to principle (9.11) in that
book. In order to make the formalization more compact,
and also more in the spirit of natural deduction style, we
do not take the principles as axiom schemas, but instead we
turn them into the following proof-rules.
Sφ
(R1)
Bφ
Dφ
(R2)
Bφ
Bφ(t) t < u ¬B¬φ(u)
(R3)
Dφ(u)
The second and third proof-rule together formalizes a “prin-
ciple of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time,
unless there is belief to the contrary.
We liberalize the side-condition on the (Term) rule such
that the formulas φ1, . . . , φn, and ψ may include formulas
on the form t < u, since we assume that the truth-values
of such formulas are not changed by the perspective shift
effected by the rule.
With this machinery in place, the shift of person per-
spective in the Sally-Anne task can be formalized as the
derivation in Figure 5. Recall that this derivation is meant
to formalize the child’s reasoning at the time t1 where the
question is answered. The first premise @aSp(t0) in the
derivation says that Sally (the reference the nominal a) at
the earlier time t0 saw that the marble was in the basket,
which the child remembers. The third premise @a¬B¬p(t1)
says that Sally at the time t1 does not believe that the mar-
ble is not in the basket, which the child realizes as Sally was
absent when the marble was transferred to the box.
Note that the actual position of the marble at the time
t1 is irrelevant to figure out the correct response. Note that
in the Sally-Anne task there is a shift of person perspective
which we deal with in a modal-logical fashion letting points
of evaluation stand for persons, like in the person version of
the Smarties task in the previous section, but there is also
a temporal shift in the Sally-Anne task, from the time t0 to
the time t1, which we deal with using first-order machinery.
8. DISCUSSION
In the introduction of the present paper we remarked that
reasoning in Seligman’s system is different from reasoning in
the most common proof systems for hybrid logic, and that
reasoning in Seligman’s system captures well the reasoning
in the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks, in particular the in-
volved shift between different local perspectives.
More can be said about this difference between the proof
systems and how local perspectives are (or are not) repre-
sented. A truth-bearer is an entity that is either true or
false. According to Peter Simons’ paper [22], there have
historically been two fundamentally opposed views of how
truth-bearers have their truth-values.
One view takes truth to be absolute: a truth-
bearer’s truth-value (whether truth or falsity) is
something it has simpliciter, without variation
according to place, time, by whom and to whom
it is said. The other view allows a truth-bearer’s
truth-value to vary according to circumstances:
typically time or place, but also other factors may
be relevant. ([22], p. 443)
Peter Simons calls the first view the absolute view and the
second the centred view. It is well-known that Arthur Prior
often expressed sympathy for what is here called the centred
view, most outspoken with respect to time, one reason being
that he wanted to allow statements to change truth-value
from one time to another. What a truth-bearer’s truth-value
varies according to, is by Simons called a location.
I understand ’location’ broadly to include not
just spatial location but also temporal location,
spatiotemporal location, modal location, and more
broadly still location in any relational structure.
I consider that the concept of an object being
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Figure 5: Formalization of the child’s reasoning in the Sally-Anne task
@aSp(t0) t0 < t1 @a¬B¬p(t1)
[a]
[a] [@aSp(t0)]
(@E)
Sp(t0)
(R1)
Bp(t0) [t0 < t1]
[a] [@a¬B¬p(t1)]
(@E)¬B¬p(t1)
(R3)
Dp(t1)
(R2)
Bp(t1)
(@I)
@aBp(t1)
(Term)
@aBp(t1)
located at a position among other positions is a
formal concept, applicable topic-neutrally in any
field of discourse. This means that logical consid-
erations about location are not limited in extent
or parochial in interest. ([22], p. 444)
The proposition expressed in the quotation above is de-
fended in Simons’ paper [21]. See also the paper [20]. Ob-
viously, a frame for modal and hybrid logic is a mathemat-
ically precise formulation of Simons’ concept of a location,
see Definition 2.1.
What does all this have to do with proof systems for hy-
brid logic? The distinction between the absolute view and
the centred view is useful for describing proof systems and
the formulas that occur in them. The basic building blocks
of the most common proof systems for hybrid logic are sat-
isfaction statements, and satisfaction statements have con-
stant truth-values, so the basic building blocks of such sys-
tems are absolute, although it is arguable that such systems
have both absolute and centred features since arbitrary sub-
formulas of satisfaction statements do have varying truth-
values, and therefore have to be evaluated for truth at some
location. On the other hand, the basic building blocks of
Seligman’s system are arbitrary formulas, and arbitrary for-
mulas have varying truth-values, so this system is centred,
involving local perspectives in the reasoning.
9. SOME REMARKS ON OTHER WORK
Beside analysing the reasoning taking place when giving
a correct answer to a reasoning task, the works by van Lam-
balgen and co-authors also analyse what goes wrong when
an incorrect answer is given. We note that Stenning and
van Lambalgen in [23] warn against simply characterizing
autism as a lack of theory of mind. Rather than being an
explanation of autism, Stenning and van Lambalgen see the
theory of mind deficit hypothesis as “an important label for
a problem that needs a label”, cf. [23], p. 243. Based on
their logical analysis, they argue that another psychologi-
cal theory of autism is more fundamental, namely what is
called the executive function deficit theory. Very briefly, ex-
ecutive function is an ability to plan and control a sequence
of actions with the aim of obtaining a goal in different cir-
cumstances.
The paper [15] reports empirical investigations of closed-
world reasoning in adults with autism. Incidentally, accord-
ing to the opening sentence of that paper, published in 2009,
“While autism is one of the most intensively researched psy-
chiatric disorders, little is known about reasoning skills of
people with autism.”
With motivations from the theory of mind literature, the
paper [25] models examples of beliefs that agents may have
about other agents’ beliefs (one example is an autistic agent
that always believes that other agents have the same beliefs
as the agent’s own). This is modelled by different agents
preference relations between states, where an agent prefers
one state over another if the agent considers it more likely.
The beliefs in question turn out to be frame-characterizable
by formulas of epistemic logic.
The paper [10] reports empirical investigations of what
is called second-order theory of mind, which is a person’s
capacity to imagine other people’s beliefs about the person’s
own beliefs (where first-order theory of mind is what we
previously in the present paper just have called theory of
mind). The investigations in [10] make use of a second-order
false-belief task, as well as other tasks.
The paper [12] does not deal with false-belief tasks or the-
ory of mind, but it is nevertheless relevant to mention since
it uses formal proofs to compare the cognitive difficulty of
deductive tasks. To be more precise, the paper associates
the difficulty of a deductive task in a version of the Master-
mind game with the minimal size of a corresponding tableau
tree, and it uses this measure of difficulty to predict the em-
pirical difficulty of game-plays, for example the number of
steps actually needed for solving a task.
The method of reasoning in tableau systems can be seen
as attempts to construct a model of a formula: A tableau
tree is built step by step using rules, whereby more and
more information about models for the formula is obtained,
and either at some stage a model can be read off from the
tableau tree, or it can be concluded that there cannot be
such a model (in fact, in the case of [12], any formula under
consideration has exactly one model, so in that case it is a
matter of building a tableau tree that generates this model).
Hence, if the building of tableau trees is taken to be the
underlying mechanism when a human is solving Mastermind
tasks, then the investigations in [12] can be seen to be in line
with the mental models school (see the third section of the
present paper).
A remark from a more formal point of view: The tableau
system described in [12] does not include the cut-rule7. Much
has been written on the size of proofs in cut-free proof sys-
tems, in particular, the paper [6] gives examples of first-
7The cut-rule says that the end of any branch in a tableau
tree can extended with two branches with φ on the one
branch and ¬φ on the other (expressing the bivalence of
classical logic).
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order formulas whose derivations in cut-free systems are
much larger than their derivations in natural deduction sys-
tems, which implicitly allow unrestricted cuts (in one case
more than 1038 characters compared to less than 3280 char-
acters). Similarly, the paper [9] points out that ordinary
cut-free tableau systems have a number of anomalies, one
of them being that for some classes of propositional formu-
las, decision procedures based on cut-free systems are much
slower than the truth-table method (in the technical sense
that there is no polynomial time computable function that
maps truth-table proofs of such formulas to proofs of the
same formulas in cut-free tableau systems). Instead of pro-
hibiting cuts completely, the paper [9] advocates allowing a
restricted version of the cut-rule, called the analytic cut-rule.
10. FUTURE WORK
We would like to extend the work of the present paper
to further false-belief tasks, perhaps using different hybrid-
logical machinery (and moreover, to see if we can also use
hybrid-logical proof-theory to analyse what goes wrong when
incorrect answers are given). Not only will formalization of
further reasoning tasks be of interest on their own, but we
also expect that such investigations can be feed back into
logical research, either as corroboration of the applicability
of existing logical constructs, or in the form of new logical
constructs, for example new proof-rules or new ways to add
expressive power to a logic.
We are also interested in further investigations in when
two seemingly dissimilar reasoning tasks have the same un-
derlying logical structure, like we in the present paper have
disclosed that two different versions of the Smarties task
have exactly the same underlying logical structure. Such
investigations might be assisted by a notion of identity on
proofs (exploiting the longstanding effort in proof-theory to
give a notion of identity between proofs, that is, a way to
determine if two arguments have common logical structure,
despite superficial dissimilarity).
More speculatively, we expect that our formalizations can
contribute to the ongoing debate between two dominating
views on theory of mind, denoted theory-theory and simulation-
theory. According to theory-theory, theory of mind should
be viewed as an explicit theory of the mental realm of an-
other person, like the theories of the physical world usually
going under the heading “naive physics”, whereas according
to simulation-theory, theory of mind should be viewed as
a capacity to put yourself in another person’s shoes, and
simulate the person’s mental states.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF ANALYTICITY
Usually, when considering a natural deduction system, one
wants to equip it with a normalizing set of reduction rules
such that normal derivations satisfy the subformula prop-
erty. Normalization says that any derivation by repeated
applications of reduction rules can be rewritten to a deriva-
tion which is normal, that is, no reduction rules apply. From
this it follows that the system under consideration is ana-
lytic.
Now, the works [7] and Section 4.3 by the present author
devise a set of reduction rules for N′H obtained by transla-
tion of a set of reduction rules for a more common natural
deduction system for hybrid logic. This more common sys-
tem, which we denote NH, can be found in [7] and in [8],
Section 2.2. All formulas in the system NH are satisfac-
tion statements. Despite other desirable features, it is not
known whether the reduction rules for N′H are normalizing,
and normal derivations do not always satisfy the subformula
property. In fact, Chapter 4 of the book [8] ends somewhat
pessimistically by exhibiting a normal derivation without the
subformula property. It is remarked that a remedy would
be to find a more complete set of reduction rules, but the
counter-example does not give a clue how such a set of re-
duction rules should look.
In what follows we shall take another route. We prove
a completeness result saying that any valid formula has a
derivation in N′H satisfying a version of the subformula
property. This is a sharpened version of a completeness
result for N′H originally given in [7] and in Section 4.3 of
[8] (Theorem 4.1 in [8]). Thus, we prove that N′H is ana-
lytic without going via a normalization result. So the proof
of the completeness result does not involve reduction rules.
The result is mathematically weaker than normalization to-
gether with the subformula property for normal derivations,
but it nevertheless demonstrates analyticity. Analyticity is
a major success criteria in proof-theory, one reason being
that analytic provability is a step towards automated the-
orem proving (which obviously is related to Leibniz’ aim
mentioned in the intoduction of the present paper).
In the proof below we shall refer to NH as well as a trans-
lation (·)◦ from NH to N′H given in [7] and Section 4.3
of [8]. This translates a derivation π in NH to a deriva-
tion π◦ in N′H having the same end-formula and parcels
of undischarged assumptions. The reader wanting to follow
the details of our proof is advised to obtain a copy of the
paper [7] or the book [8]. The translation (·)◦ satisfies the
following.
Lemma A.1. Let π be a derivation in NH. Any formula
θ occuring in π◦ has at least one of the following properties.
1. θ occurs in π.
2. @aθ occurs in π for some satisfaction operator @a.
3. θ is a nominal a such that some formula @aψ occurs
in π.
Proof. Induction on the structure of the derivation of π.
Each case in the translation (·)◦ is checked.
Note that in item 1 of the lemma above, the formula θ must
be a satisfaction statement since only satisfaction statements
occur in π. In what follows @dΓ denotes the set of formulas
{@dξ | ξ ∈ Γ}.
Theorem A.2. Let π be a normal derivation of @dφ from
@dΓ in NH. Any formula θ occuring in π◦ has at least one
of the following properties.
1. θ is of the form @aψ such that ψ is a subformula of φ,
some formula in Γ, or some formula of the form c or
♦c.
2. θ is a subformula of φ, some formula in Γ, or some
formula of the form c or ♦c.
3. θ is a nominal.
4. θ is of the form @a(p → ⊥) or p → ⊥ where p is a
subformula of φ or some formula in Γ.
5. θ is of the form @a⊥ or ⊥.
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.1 above together with
Theorem 2.4 (called the quasi-subformula property) in Sub-
section 2.2.5 of [8].
We are now ready to give our main result, which is a sharp-
ened version of the completeness result given in Theorem 4.1
in Section 4.3 of [8].
Theorem A.3. The first statement below implies the sec-
ond statement. Let φ be a formula and Γ a set of formulas.
1. For any model M, any world w, and any assignment g,
if, for any formula ξ ∈ Γ, M, g, w |= ξ, then M, g, w |=
φ.
2. There exists of derivation of φ from Γ in N′H such
that any formula θ occuring in the derivation has at
least one of the five properties listed in Theorem A.2.
Proof. Let d be a new nominal. It follows that for any
model M and any assignment g, if, for any formula @dξ ∈
@dΓ, M, g |= @dξ, then M, g |= @dφ. By completeness of
the system NH, Theorem 2.2 in Subsection 2.2.3 of the book
[7], there exists a derivation π of @dφ from @dΓ in NH. By
normalization, Theorem 2.3 in Subsection 2.2.5 of the book,
we can assume that π is normal. We now apply the rules
(@I), (@E), and (Name) to π◦ obtaining a derivation of
φ from Γ in N′H satisfying at least one of the properties
mentioned in Theorem A.2.
Remark: If the formula occurrence θ mentioned in the the-
orem above is not of one of the forms covered by item 4 in
Theorem A.2, and does not have one of a finite number of
very simple forms not involving propositional symbols, then
either θ is a subformula of φ or some formula in Γ, or θ is
of the form @aψ such that ψ is a subformula of φ or some
formula in Γ. This is the version of the subformula property
we intended to prove.
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